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Shale Gas and
Clean Energy Policy
Joseph P. Tomain †
“America needs a new political discourse on energy. This would
recognize the emerging reality that the United States has turned
around as an energy producer and is on a major upswing. And
the impact will be measured not just in energy security and the
balance of payments. Energy development also turns out to be
an engine for job creation and economic growth—something
that would hardly have been considered the last time we were
electing a president.” *
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Introduction
A recent report from the International Energy Agency (IEA)
makes claims similar to those expressed by Daniel Yergin. Both
commentators argue that new fossil fuel discoveries in the United
States are having a profound impact on domestic and global energy
policies. According to the IEA, “[t]he global energy map is changing”
and “is being redrawn by the resurgence in oil and gas production in
the United States.”1 Industry observers project that by 2020, the
†

Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of Law
University of Cincinnati College of Law.

*

Daniel Yergin, America’s New Energy Reality, N.Y. Times, June 10,
2012, at SR9. Yergin argues that the increase in fossil fuel discoveries
(particularly natural gas from shale formations), lower demand for
imported oil, an increase in domestic oil production, and technological
developments have “improved” our fossil fuel picture and that we are
making gains toward “energy independence” while “rebalancing world oil.”
Further, he argues that oil and gas should be seen as an “engine of
economic growth.”

1.

Int’l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012: Executive
Summary 1 (2012).
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United States will produce more oil than Saudi Arabia and more
natural gas than Russia.2 In addition, the IEA reports that the global
energy map is changing as countries retreat from nuclear power and
replace it with rapidly growing wind and solar technologies.3 Other
commentators, like Professor Richard Pierce, claim that shale gas
addresses all of our major energy problems,4 while still others treat
this natural gas resource as a bridge fuel to the future.5 Indeed, in his
2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama cited experts who
predicted that the natural gas industry will create 600,000 jobs by the
end of the decade.6 As remarkable as these claims are, the United
States is not scheduled to be energy independent without a robust
clean energy economy, even in the brightest projections.7
To be sure, these new finds of natural gas have much to
recommend them. First, recent discoveries reveal abundant reserves
and, following abundance, consumers enjoy lower natural gas prices.8
Second, natural gas emits about half of the carbon dioxide released by
coal. As a result of these lower prices and less drastic environmental
effects, natural gas is beginning to displace coal for electricity
generation.9 Fourth, the increase in domestic production adds jobs to

2.

See Michael Levi, Think Again: The American Energy Boom, Foreign
Pol’y, July–Aug. 2012, at 55, 55 (noting industry predictions that “by
2020, the United States will become the world’s largest producer of oil
and gas”).

3.

International Energy Agency, supra note 1, at 6 (projecting an
increase in the use of renewables as the role of nuclear power declines).

4.

Richard J. Peirce, Jr., Natural Gas Fracking Addresses All of Our
Major Problems, J. Energy & Envtl. L. (forthcoming May 2013)
(manuscript at 3–5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2172441.

5.

Stephen P.A. Brown et al., Res. for the Future & Nat’l
Energy Pol’y Inst., Natural Gas: A Bridge to a Low-Carbon
Future? 2 (2009); John D. Podesta & Timothy E. Wirth, Ctr. for
Am. Progress & Energy Future Coal., Natural Gas: A Bridge
Fuel for the 21st Century 1 (2009).

6.

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the
Union Address (January 24, 2012).

7.

Levi, supra note 2, at 56.

8.

Stephen P.A. Brown et al., Resources for the Future, Abundant
Shale Gas Resources: Some Implications for Energy Policy 11
(2010).

9.

See John Corrigan & Jim Hendrickson, Shale vs. Coal, Pub. Util.
Fort., May 2012, at 20, 21 (noting that the “emergence of ample
supplies of natural gas at moderate to low prices and the prospect of
more stringent air emissions regulations” is likely to result in “a
moderate, but uneven, shift from older, coal-fired plants to more
efficient gas-fired plants”).
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the economy.10 Fifth, the United States is beginning to reduce imports
and increase exports, thus reducing the trade deficit as the United
States grows more energy independent.11 Not only are we less reliant
on imports, natural gas can be adopted for use in the transportation
sector—further reducing our reliance on oil.12 And, sixth, new
discoveries have the effect of smoothing out the price volatility
experienced by the natural gas sector for the last two decades.13
There is other good news for the U.S. energy economy. In addition
to developing our own resources, U.S. energy consumption has been
declining in recent years. According to Worldwatch Institute measurements, energy use in 2012 was 7% below the 2007 level and that decline
constituted the steepest five-year decrease in approximately sixty
years.14 Additionally, renewable resources, particularly wind, are
increasing their share of the country’s energy portfolio. Most notably, we
are beginning to witness a decline in carbon dioxide emissions as well as
reductions in other greenhouse gas emissions such as sulfur dioxide.15
But open questions remain. If we look behind the numbers on
energy consumption, how much of that declining consumption is
attributable to increases in energy efficiency and how much is
attributable to a poor economy? If we look more closely at shale gas
production, particularly when we consider hydraulic fracturing, what
environmental costs are associated with developing this domestic
resource? And, from a broader perspective, what role should natural
10.

See Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, The Role of Oil and Gas in
Driving Job Growth, Brookings (June 1, 2012, 8:23 AM), http://
www.brookings.edu/blogs/jobs/posts/2012/06/01-jobs-greenstone-looney
(“Between 2007 and 2011, employment in oil and gas extraction
increased by 28,000.”).

11.

See Editorial, Natural-Gas Exports Could Lift U.S. Trade and Economy,
Bloomberg (Nov. 25, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-11-25/natural-gas-exports-could-lift-u-s-trade-and-economy.html
(“Liquid natural gas exports could add billions to the U.S. economy, create
tens of thousands of long-term jobs and help narrow the trade gap.”).

12.

Peter Orszag, Natural-Gas Cars Can Drive Us Toward a Better
Economy, Bloomberg (June 26, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2012-06-26/natural-gas-cars-can-drive-us-toward-a-better-e
conomy.html; Floyd Norris, Natural Gas for Vehicles Could Use U.S.
Support, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2012, at B1.

13.

See Natural Gas: U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. Energy Info.
Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9
190us3m.htm (last updated Feb. 28, 2013) (providing monthly statistical
evidence of sharp changes in the wellhead price of U.S. natural gas).

14.

Chris Flavin, Transforming U.S. Energy: The 2012 Story the Media
Missed, Revolt (Jan. 16, 2013) http://blogs.worldwatch.org/revolt/tra
nsforming-u-s-energy-the-2012-story-the-media-missed.

15.

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Environment, Monthly
Energy Rev., Dec. 21, 2012, at 157, 158.
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gas, including shale gas, play in the country’s clean energy future?
Will we continue to favor fossil-fuel incumbents at the expense of new
entrants in renewable resources and energy efficiency?16
This Article will address these questions by first describing the
clean energy transition in Parts I–III. Next, in Part IV, the Article
will describe the role of natural gas and shale gas in our contemporary
energy picture. Finally, in Part V, the Article will identify some of the
costs attributable to shale gas production, including the possibility
that our current focus on shale gas will simply result in a new
hydrocarbon future at the expense of a vibrant and productive clean
energy economy. The Article concludes in Part VI with some
recommendations for future shale gas regulation. While acknowledging
the reality that shale gas will play an increasingly larger role in our
energy portfolio, the Article argues that natural gas should not be
considered a clean energy resource.

I.

Clean Energy Transition

The transition from a fossil fuel economy to a clean energy
economy will be socially, economically, and politically transformative.
To accomplish that transformation, innovations in policy and
regulation, markets and business practices, and technology policy and
its implementation will be necessary. In Ending Dirty Energy Policy, I
argued that over the last generation, the United States has developed
a policy consensus in favor of clean energy.17 In short, we cannot
effectively address climate change nor can we become more energy
secure until we transform our energy policy away from fossil fuels to
clean energy. Further, a sound business argument can be made for
developing a clean energy economy on its own without necessarily
tying it to climate-change initiatives. Clearly, clean energy and
climate change are complementary policies; nevertheless, the United
States should proceed with a clean energy transition now rather than
wait for reluctant federal leadership on the climate front.
16.

Although this Article concentrates on natural gas, the United States is
also experiencing increased oil production, often from geologically
difficult formations that require technological advances in exploration
and drilling. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Vast Oil Reserve May Now Be
Within Reach, and Battle Heats Up, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2013, at A9
(“For decades, oilmen have been unable to extricate the Monterey
Shale’s crude because of its complex geological formation, which makes
extraction quite expensive. But as the oil industry’s technological
advances succeed in unlocking oi1 from increasingly difficult locations,
there is heady talk that California could be in store for a new oil
boom.”); Chip Brown, North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. Times Mag.,
Feb. 3, 2013, at 22.

17.

Joseph P. Tomain, Ending Dirty Energy Policy: Prelude to
Climate Change (2011).
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Today, it is also the case that public opinion favors a clean energy
policy.18 I further argued that a clean energy consensus is being
developed from the bottom-up rather than through top-down
leadership at the federal level—despite the clean energy initiatives of
the Obama administration.19 In other words, although federal
leadership is lacking,20 clean energy activities at the state, regional,
and local levels—as well as investment activities in the private
sector—are pursuing a clean energy agenda.21 As an aside, we have
yet to develop a more complete clean energy politics and that is a
matter that needs to be addressed.22 Now, due to the increasing use of

18.

Justin Gillis, Willing to Pay (a Little) More for Clean Energy, N.Y.
Times Green (May 14, 2012, 7:57 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/05/14/willing-to-pay-a-little-for-clean-energy; News Release,
Nuclear Energy Inst., Public Opinion Survey Shows Overwhelming
Support for Clean Energy Loan Guarantees (Feb. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/news-releases/public-opinion-survey-sh
ows-overwhelming-support-f; Ruy Teixeira, Public Opinion Snapshot:
Strong Support for Clean-Energy Economy, Ctr. for Am. Progress
(Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/public-opinion/
news/2009/03/30/5810/public-opinion-snapshot-strong-support-for-clean-en
ergy-economy.

19.

The Obama Administration has, through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (commonly referred to as the Stimulus Bill), Pub. L.
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), and other initiatives, significantly
increased clean energy research and development, negotiated higher
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards with car manufacturers and the United Automobile Workers (“UAW”) to reach 54.5
miles per gallon by 2025, and set higher ozone and mercury standards for
power plants. Juliet Eilperin, U.S., Auto Industry Agree on Long-Range
Fuel Efficiency Rules, Wash. Post, July 28, 2011, at A17; Colleen
Curtis, President Obama Announces New Fuel Economy Standards,
White House Blog (July 29, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2011/07/29/president-obama-announces-new-fuel-economy-standards; see
also News Release, EPA, EPA Issues First National Standards for
Mercury Pollution from Power Plants (Dec. 21, 2011), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400
c27/bd8b3f37edf5716d8525796d005dd086!opendocument (estimating that
the new rules will prevent up to 46,000 premature deaths and 540,000
asthma attacks among children).

20.

See Justin Gillis, Politics Slows Climate Study, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25,
2011, at A1.

21.

Investments in a clean energy transition continue to increase. See REN21,
Renewables 2012: Global Status Report 15 (2012) (“Global new
investment in renewables rose 17% to a record USD 257 billion in 2011.
This was more than six times the figure for 2004 and almost twice the
total investment in 2007, the last year before the acute phase of the
recent global financial crisis.”).

22.

Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change 1–10 (2d ed.,
rev. and updated 2011). I will address this issue in Joseph P. Tomain,
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natural gas in general, and shale gas in particular, the timely question
is: What role should natural gas play in the clean energy transition?
This Article will address that issue.
It can and has been argued that a transition to clean energy is
necessary if the country is to formally address climate change. But the
converse is not true—a transition to clean energy is not dependent
upon addressing climate change.23 Instead, a clean energy economy is
independently valuable. While the business and economic case for
clean energy is sound,24 barriers to this transition exist. For any
regulatory program to gain traction and become implemented in the
United States, it is necessary that a proposed program have a policy
basis, a proper set of regulatory and legal tools, and political
support.25 As noted, there is ample policy support for a full-scale clean
energy policy.26 Nevertheless, legal and political challenges remain,
including the matter of how to treat natural gas.

Clean Energy Politics:
(forthcoming 2014).

The

Necessity

of

Innovation

23.

But see James Gustave Speth, The 10th Annual John H. Chafee
Memorial Lecture, A New American Environmentalism and the New
Economy (Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Speth, New American Environmentalism], available at http://neweconomicsinstitute.org/publication
ns/lectures/speth/gus/a-new-american-environmentalism (arguing that a
green economy is not enough); see also James Gustave Speth, Thirtieth
Annual E.F. Schumacher Lectures, Letter to Liberals: Liberalism,
Environmentalism, and Economic Growth (Nov. 20, 2010), available at
http://neweconomicsinstitute.org/publications/letter-liberals-liberalismenvironmentalism-and-economic-growth; James Gustave Speth, Off the
Pedestal: Creating a New Vision of Economic Growth, Yale
Envtl.
360
(May
31,
2011),
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/
off_the_pedestal_creating_a_new_vision_of_economic_growth/2409/;
James Gustave Speth, Towards a New Economy and a New Politics,
Solutions J., May 2010, at 33.

24.

See Ron Pernick et al., Clean Energy Trends 2010, at 2 (2010),
available at http://info.cleanenergyeducation.net/pdf/Trends2010.pdf
(noting that “[c]lean energy has become a driving force for economic
recovery”); see also Bill Clinton, Back to Work: Why We Need
Smart Government for a Strong Economy 139–69 (2011)
(describing the economic benefits that an investment in clean energy
will bring).

25.

See Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Regulatory Law
and Policy 3 (3d ed. 2003) (“The making of regulatory policy in
American government is influenced by politics, policy considerations and
legal constraints.”); Joseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing
Government Regulation, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 377, 386 (1997)
(“[R]egulation in the legislative arena is the product of the interaction of
politics, policy, and law.”).

26.

See Tomain, Ending Dirty Energy Policy, supra note 17, at 92–120
(describing the targets of and need for clean energy policy).
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The legal challenges reside, first, in a body of law that has served
the country well for most of the twentieth century by building a
national energy infrastructure and by providing reliable and relatively
inexpensive energy to fuel economic growth. Second, and
unfortunately, the dominant energy model came with significant
costs—it ignored environmental harms and constrained energy
markets. And, third, the traditional model favored particular actors
and sustained, through laws and regulations, a narrow industrial
structure. Quite simply, large fossil fuel firms dominated, and
continue to dominate,27 our energy economy, thus retarding the
development of new energy markets and a more competitive energy
economy. Shale gas, then, will most likely have the effect of further
strengthening our traditional hydrocarbon economy while threatening
the growth of the clean energy sector.
A clean energy program must also confront multiple political
challenges. Here two are highlighted. The political challenges,
unsurprisingly, are consistent with and connected to the laws and
regulations already in place. Those laws and regulations were shaped
by and have given fossil fuel incumbents significant and continuing
political power.28 Even though I argue that clean energy enjoys broad
27.

See Editorial, Big Coal’s Bidding, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2011, at A22
(noting that “it will likely take another disaster before lawmakers will
be willing to buck Big Coal and pass desperately needed safety
legislation”).

28.

Regarding the current political economy vis-à-vis the environment:
The first step in building a green economy is to ask why the
current system is so destructive. As I describe in The Bridge at
the Edge of the World, the answer lies in the defining features of
our current political economy. An unquestioning society-wide
commitment to economic growth at almost any cost; powerful
corporate interests whose overriding objective is to grow by
generating profit, including profit from avoiding the environmental costs they create and from replicating technologies
designed with little regard for the environment; markets that
systematically fail to recognize environmental costs unless
corrected by government; government that is subservient to
corporate interests and the growth imperative; rampant consumerism spurred endlessly by sophisticated advertising; economic
activity now so large in scale that its impacts alter the
fundamental biophysical operations of the planet—all these
combine to deliver an ever-growing world economy that is
undermining the ability of the planet to sustain life. These are key
issues—these issues that are more systemic—that must be
addressed by our new environmentalism.
Speth, New American Environmentalism, supra note 23 (referencing
James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World:
Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability (2008) [hereinafter Speth, The Bridge]).
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political support, incumbency hinders transition efforts. The first
political challenge, then, is to overcome the power and influence of
fossil fuel incumbency. Simply put, increased oil and gas production
empowers incumbents. Second, although public opinion favors clean
energy, public opinion is less supportive of climate change legislation.
More problematically, federal legislators show no interest in
introducing climate change legislation despite President Obama’s
recognition of the necessity to “roll back the specter of a warming
planet” in his Second Inaugural Address.29 One danger for clean
energy advocates, then, is that the politics of clean energy run the
risk of getting entangled in and confused with climate change
initiatives, thus impeding the energy transition.30 Any confusion
between clean energy and climate change can be dispelled by making
the case that economic growth will accompany a clean energy agenda
while the relationship between economic growth and climate change is
currently contested.31 Although shale gas may help the economy for
the time being, it is not responsive to the challenges of climate
change. For that reason, and for others addressed immediately below,
while shale gas is a cleaner burning fossil fuel than coal, it is not a
clean energy resource.

II. Defining Clean Energy
There are significant reasons for and consequences attached to
labeling a resource, such as shale gas, a clean energy resource.
Although clean energy is generally understood to encompass a greater
use of renewable resources and to capture increased gains from energy
efficiency,32 it is necessary to more precisely identify those resources
that constitute a clean energy portfolio for several reasons. First,
simply as a matter of interest-group politics, the correct naming and
framing of policy issues is necessary. Second, it must be noted, and
emphasized, that sound clean energy politics is not inimical to
29.

President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009).

30.

See, e.g., Naomi Klein, Capitalism vs. The Climate, The Nation, Nov.
28, 2011, at 11, 12 (noting that, from 2007 to 2011, there was an abrupt
downward shift in the percentage of Americans who believed that “the
continued burning of fossil fuels would cause the climate to change”).

31.

See Speth, The Bridge, supra note 28, at 89–107 (2008) (describing
the potential major contributions of environmental economics).

32.

See The Law of Clean Energy: Efficiency and Renewables 1–18
(Michael B. Gerrard, ed., 2011) (describing the role of energy efficiency
and renewable resources in creating clean energy); Amory Lovins,
Rocky Mountain Inst., Reinventing Fire: Bold Business
Solutions for the New Energy Era xiii (2011) (“[Clean energy]
combines two elements: it uses energy very efficiently, and it gets that
energy from diverse and mainly dispersed renewable sources.”).
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economic growth; instead, clean energy is necessary for a vibrant
economic future.33 Third, and correlatively, a clear definition will
enable policymakers and analysts to more accurately define the
metrics and set the goals needed to measure the gains in an emerging
clean energy economy. And, fourth, defining clean energy has direct
legal consequences. Once a resource, such as solar or wind power, is
defined as a clean energy resource, then it can qualify for particular
regulatory treatment or for government subsidies, as examples.
Currently, the definition of clean energy differs according to
particular applications.34 As states move forward and establish
renewable portfolio standards (RPS), for example, the resources that
qualify under those standards differ from state to state. Some states
include nuclear power while others exclude it. Another open issue is
whether to include “clean coal” in an RPS program. Indeed, in
contrast to RPS programs, electricity advocates favor clean energy
standards (CES) that explicitly include clean coal and nuclear power
as central to their definition of clean energy.35 Another unresolved
issue is whether or not RPS or CES programs should be rationalized
across the country or if states should be free to use distinct definitions
in order to take advantage of differences in regional energy resources.36
33.

See Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the
Remaking of the Modern World 4 (2011) (noting that oil, coal, and
natural gas alone are unlikely to meet the world’s increasing demand for
energy); Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Price of Civilization:
Reawakening American Virtue and Prosperity 201–04 (2011)
(arguing for a pathway to a self-financing clean energy system);
Thomas L. Friedman & Michael Mandelbaum, That Used to Be
Us: How America Fell Behind in the World it Invented and
How We Can Come Back 199–211 (2011) (describing how a clean
energy policy can make America “healthier, more prosperous, more
secure, and more resilient”).

34.

The clean energy economy has also been characterized as “sustainable
capitalism,” defined as “a framework that seeks to maximize long-term
economic value by reforming markets to address real needs while
integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics
throughout the decision-making process.” Al Gore & David Blood, A
Manifesto for Sustainable Capitalism, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 2011, at
A21 (arguing that longer-term thinking about investments according to
ESG metrics will: (1) develop sustainable products and services for
longer term profits; (2) reduce waste and increase energy efficiency; (3)
increase the effectiveness of risk management by, for example, more
efficient compliance practices; and, (4) lower the cost of debt).

35.

See Ctr. for Climate and Energy Solutions & Reg. Assistance
Project, Clean Energy Standards: State and Federal Policy
Options and Implications 1 (Nov. 2011).

36.

Compare Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a
National RPS, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1339, 1339 (2010) (favoring national
standards), with Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a
National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 361,
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Clean energy, then, must be clearly defined. The most
problematic energy resource in this regard remains nuclear power.
Nuclear power generation, of course, emits no carbon dioxide, yet the
carbon footprint for the entire nuclear fuel cycle is not completely
carbon neutral.37 Regardless of its carbon footprint, however, nuclear
power is the quintessential example of a traditional energy form in
that it is large scale, centralized, and capital intensive. Further, the
industry would not exist without government support.38 The
argument, then, can be made that nuclear power should not be
considered an environmentally friendly, clean resource because it fits
so comfortably within the hard-path paradigm. Still, the issue of
whether nuclear power should be considered a clean energy resource
remains contentious.
Similar challenges attend shale gas. Although shale gas emits less
carbon than coal, it is still a dirty resource. Further, shale gas is
underpriced—even given its current abundance—because the cost of
carbon is not included in the cost. Shale gas, then, is simply an
extension of our traditional hydrocarbon economy, favored by
government for over a century.
Although clean energy constitutes approximately 9% of today’s
U.S. fossil fuel economy, it is making notable gains.39 Renewable
resources, particularly wind power, are outstripping the installation of
new fossil fuel electricity generation.40 Further, energy efficiency is
increasing notably, and the costs of solar and wind resources are
decreasing.41 Even though clean energy is not currently cost
competitive and enjoys government subsidies, no energy resource
operates in unfettered competitive markets. Clean energy gains must
361 (disfavoring a national RPS); see also David B. Spence, Federalism,
Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 431, 507 (2013) (arguing that the federal government should
“restrict its regulation of fracking to those aspects of the industry that
produce inter-state effects or implicate established national interests”).
37.

See generally Amory B. Lovins, Renewable Energy’s “Footprint” Myth,
24 Elec. J. 40 (2011) (comparing the land-use footprint of renewable
electricity with that of nuclear power and finding that nuclear power
requires more land).

38.

Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F.
221, 227 (2005).

39.

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Annual
Energy Review 2011, at 6, 278 (2012).

40.

See Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Wind Energy Update 8 (Jan.
2012) (illustrating how new wind energy capacity increases outpaced fossil
fuel capacity increases for three of the four years from 2007 to 2010).

41.

See Int’l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook ch. 9 (2010)
(positing that short-term government support for renewable energy is
necessary to ensure long-term cost competitiveness with fossil fuels).
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be tracked and reliable metrics must be established to fully
understand the dollar value of investments in clean energy and the
corresponding reductions in greenhouse gases, particularly carbon
dioxide. Here lies the rub: although pricing carbon is notoriously
difficult,42 the failure to account for this harmful externality caused by
shale gas in the price of electricity leads directly to underpricing the
resource and over consuming it, to the direct detriment of the
environment and human health.

III. The Political Economy of Clean Energy
In addition to identifying the resources that satisfy the definition
of clean energy, the assumptions behind a clean energy policy must be
articulated with equal clarity. Identifying the policy assumptions
behind a clean energy economy will distinguish the new economy from
traditional energy firms and markets and will have a direct impact on
how shale gas is perceived and regulated. The clean energy
assumptions, in turn, will signal the structure and design of clean
energy firms and markets. First enunciated by Amory Lovins in his
book Soft Energy Paths,43 a clean, or smart, energy economy is in
many ways the diametric opposite of our traditional and current
energy system.
It is fundamental that energy is valued as a primary input into
the economy. This proposition is more nuanced than may first appear.
Energy is a more important input for developing economies than for
developed ones.44 Further, depending on the amount of fossil fuels in

42.

See Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, The Social Cost of
Carbon, Real-World Econ. Rev., June 26, 2010, at 129, 129 (“Any
estimate of the [social cost of carbon] rests on a number of value
judgments and predictions about uncertain future events.”); Philip Q.
Hanser & Mariko Geronimo, What Price, GHGs?: Calculating the Implied
Value of CO2 Abatement in Green Energy Policies, Pub. Util. Fort.,
Oct. 2012, at 12, 12 (“No [calculation] mechanism is necessarily right or
wrong: each is designed to address region- or state-specific concerns that
sometimes go beyond CO2 abatement.”); Warwick J. McKibbin et
al., Brookings, Pricing Carbon in the United States: A ModelBased Analysis of Power Sector Only Approaches (2012)
(examining the merits of various cap-and-trade calculation approaches).

43.

Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable
Peace 4 (1977) (“The basic tenet of high-energy projections is that the
more energy we use, the better off we are. But how much energy we use
to accomplish our social goals could instead be considered a measure less
of our success than of our failure.”).

44.

See Catherine A. O’Neill & Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and the
Environment: Trading Debt and Technology for Nature, 17 Colum. J.
Envtl. L. 93, 96–98 (1992) (discussing potential solutions for industrialized nations to encourage sustainable growth in developing nations).
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the energy mix, energy can become an economic drag.45 Notably, in
the United States, as a matter of historic policy, we have constructed
an economy that requires energy that must be relatively cheap,
reliable, available on demand, and central to economic growth. For
most of the twentieth century, those parameters dictated that oil,
natural gas, and coal form the basis of our energy economy. Thus,
dirty energy has been buoyed by public policy and government
support, and cheap fossil fuel energy has been treated as a public
good, creating a much-relied-upon consumer expectation that energy
prices will remain low and energy will remain abundant.
Similarly, the commercial nuclear power industry was the creation
of government and cannot exist without its life-sustaining public
financial support.46 In other words, nuclear power and fossil fuel
resources do not compete in truly competitive markets. Instead, they
benefit from a system of legal regulations and institutions, which have
fostered and continue to sustain their development and expansion.47
No longer should these resources receive such favored treatment. The
social costs of dirty energy are too high and the opportunity to pursue
clean energy should not be squandered.
Further, traditional U.S. energy policy generated an identifiable
model with specific industrial characteristics, which has been
criticized as unsuitable for continuing to meet the nation’s long-term
energy demands.48 Most notably, traditional energy firms are national
45.

See generally Joseph P. Tomain, To a Point, 52 Loy. L. Rev. 1201
(2006) (assessing the societal and economic costs of climate change
resulting from excessive fossil fuel use).

46.

See Amory B. Lovins & Imran Sheikh, Rocky Mountain Inst., The
Nuclear Illusion 1 (2008) (arguing that nuclear power is “grossly
uncompetitive”); Doug Koplow, Union of Concerned Scientists,
Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable Without Subsidies 1 (2011)
(arguing that taxpayer subsidies “enabled the nation’s existing [nuclear]
reactors to be built . . . [and] supported their operation for decades”).

47.

See Matthew L. Wald, Approval of Reactor Design Clears Path for New
Plants, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2011, at B6 (illustrating streamlined
administrative regulations and loan programs initiated by Congress to
offset nuclear power’s competitive deficiencies).

48.

See Tomain, Ending Dirty Energy Policy, supra note 17, at 65–91
(tracing the evolution of energy policy to encompass notions of
conservation); Michael J. Graetz, The End of Energy: The
Unmaking of America’s Environment, Security and Independence
(2011) (examining the relationship between continued reliance on fossil
fuels and national stability); Lincoln Davies, Alternative Energy and the
Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 Idaho L. Rev. 473 (2010)
(examining the disjunction between traditional energy regulation and
environmental regulation); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The
Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market
Power, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 131 (2012) (arguing that the “manipulation and
deceit” emphasis of securities law makes it a poor model for protection
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in scope, large scale, capital intensive, and highly centralized.49 In the
areas of electricity and natural gas, moreover, they operate as regional
monopolies.50 A clean energy economy will look dramatically different.
Most prominently, it will not be fossil fuel based. Secondarily, a clean
energy economy will be decentralized and scaled to task. In the words
of Amory Lovins, using nuclear power to boil water is “like cutting
butter with a chainsaw.”51 Therefore, as an example of smarter and
smaller-scale energy sources, a clean energy economy would substitute
distributed electricity generation for nuclear behemoths. Distributed
generation is closer to end users, can relieve stress from an
overburdened transmission grid, will increase energy efficiency, and
can make better use of local renewable resources rather than
continuing to rely upon large-scale fossil fuels like shale gas.52
Third, a clean energy market will be structured differently than
existing energy markets. The traditional energy market has been
dominated by a handful of large firms that exercise their competitive
advantage as incumbents to keep out new entrants. Clean energy
providers, such as solar, wind, distributed generation, and energy
efficient appliance producers, all threaten to reduce the market share
of fossil fuel incumbents. Firms and markets in a clean energy
economy will be smaller, more numerous, and more competitive than
those in the existing energy economy. Thus, these new entrants
promise to open new energy markets, increase competition, increase
consumer choice, and promote technological innovation.
Additionally, while traditional energy markets were regional and
national in scope, a clean energy economy will be both local and
global. At the global level, for example, the European Union is
actively promoting clean energy initiatives.53 It has established a

against the market power problems that energy regulation presents);
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93
Cornell L. Rev. 765 (2008) (pointing out the difficulties energy markets
have experience in transitioning from a regulatory-based model to a
market-based model).
49.

Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy
Policy, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 355, 375–76 (1990) [hereinafter Tomain,
The Dominant Model]; see also Spence & Prentice, supra note 48, at 149
(providing a helpful chart of industry-specific characteristics).

50.

Davies, supra note 48, at 482; Spence & Prentice, supra note 48, at 148.

51.

Amory Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 Foreign
Aff. 65, 79 (1976).

52.

See Melissa Powers, Small is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy
Policies to Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 Wisc.
Int’l L.J. (forthcoming 2013).

53.

See generally European Climate Foundation, Roadmap 2050: A
Practical Guide to a Prosperous, Low-Carbon Europe (Apr.

1199

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 63· Issue 4·2013
Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy

technical regime for the expansion of the smart grid. Indeed, the vast
majority of households in Italy have had smart meters installed to
reduce the cost of electricity.54 As another example, Germany is
scheduled to decommission all of its nuclear power and has adopted
rules promoting renewable resources to generate electricity.55 On the
other side of the globe, China is the world leader in the development
of commercial solar and wind technologies,56 and India is ramping up
its solar capacity as an alternative to coal-fired electricity.57 At the
local level, smaller-scale power production, new energy-saving
buildings and appliances, smarter meters and controls, and consumer
energy audits will have the effect of increasing consumer choice
through increased competition.
All of these efforts have two direct effects on U.S. clean energy
development. First, the experiences of other countries provide us with
valuable information that has the effect of reducing the slope of the
learning curve for further clean energy development and
implementation. Second, more clean energy technologies and products
will be increasingly traded in global and local markets. Whereas the
traditional energy economy was decidedly national, clean energy
stretches the borders of energy markets and can operate at the local
scale.
Finally, the political economy of clean energy will be advanced to
the extent that clean energy can be pursued independently from
climate change. Climate change is threatening in no small part
2010) (discussing the strategy for dramatically reducing greenhouse
gases in Europe over the coming decades).
54.

Mark Scott, How Italy Beat the World to a Smarter Grid, Bloomberg
Businessweek, Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/
content/nov2009/gb20091116_319929.htm (“Some 85% of Italian homes
are now outfitted with smart meter—the highest percentage in the
world and more such devices than exist in the whole of the U.S.”).

55.

Nuclear Power in Germany, World Nuclear Association, http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Germany (last
updated Mar. 2013) (“A coalition government formed after the 1998
federal elections had the phasing out of nuclear energy as a feature of its
policy. With a new government in 2009, the phase-out was cancelled,
but then reintroduced in 2011, with eight reactors shut down
immediately.”).

56.

Solidiance, China's Renewable Energy Sector: An Overview of
Key Growth Sectors 6 (2013), available at http://www.solidiance
.com/whitepaper/china-renewable.pdf (“China’s demand for energy as
well as its capabilities and capacity for energy production are now
positioning China to seize the opportunity to take the lead in the
development of sustainable energy technologies, so as to further cement
its position as an international leader in renewable energies.”).

57.

Vikas Bajaj, India’s Investment in the Sun, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2011,
at B1.
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because it appears to require notable changes in lifestyle and, perhaps,
in quality of life. Whether these threats are true or not is beside the
point. Public opinion sometimes fears climate change in ways that it
does not fear clean energy. Currently, clean energy can remain
“invisible” and, therefore, can be seen as more politically benign.
Similarly, transitioning to a clean energy economy does not appear as
daunting as responding to climate change. Compared with climate
change, clean energy science and technologies are simpler. Clean
energy initiatives can be implemented on shorter time frames. Clean
energy consumer education can be done expeditiously and more
intelligibly and clean energy consumers can more quickly see results.
And producers have more reliable markets. Consequently, jobs,
investments, and markets can likewise develop quicker than more
complex climate change efforts.58

IV. Natural Gas and the Energy Portfolio
For over fifty years, the U.S. energy economy was stable and
predictable, even if problematic. From 1949 until about 2005, U.S.
energy exports were flat, but imports, particularly of petroleum,
continued to rise, and production and consumption largely grew in
tandem.59 In 1970, as domestic oil production peaked, consumption
and production began to separate from each other.60 Domestic production could not keep pace with consumption and, as a consequence, we
grew more dependent on foreign energy resources, especially OPEC
oil.61 In addition, fossil fuels dominated our energy economy, with
renewable resources barely scratching 2–3% of total U.S. energy
production until recently.62
Dramatic changes began to occur around 2005. Production and
consumption grew closer together, exports increased, and imports
decreased.63 Further, on the domestic production side, we began to
experience a decline in coal production, an increase in natural gas and
crude oil production, the flattening of nuclear power, and an uptick in

58.

Cf. Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, In Brief: Clean
Energy Markets: Jobs and Opportunities 1 (July 2011), available
at http://www.c2es.org/publications/brief-clean-energy-markets-jobs-andopportunities (estimating global investments of approximately $2.3 trillion
over the next decade, with corresponding job creation).

59.

Annual Energy Review 2011, supra note 39, at 118–19.

60.

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Annual
Energy Outlook 2012, at 3 (2012).

61.

Tomain, The Dominant Model, supra note 49, at 373.

62.

Annual Energy Review 2011, supra note 39, at 278–79.

63.

Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 3.
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energy produced by renewable resources.64 Correspondingly, on the
consumption side, also from the middle of the last decade, we
experienced declines in oil and coal consumption and increases in
natural gas and renewable resource consumption.65
Aside from a notable, and recent, increase in wind power
production,66 no other resource has had as notable a turnaround as
natural gas. Natural gas production in the United States has increased
dramatically in recent years, rising from approximately 16 trillion
cubic feet (tcf) in 1990 to over 22 tcf in 2010, with projections rising
to in excess of 27 tcf by 2035.67 Those projections indicate that the
United States has over 100 years of natural gas at current levels of
consumption,68 although such estimates are contestable.69 Shale gas is
largely responsible for this trend, increasing from approximately 1.3
tcf in 2007, to in excess of 5.3 tcf in 2010,70 while accounting for
nearly half of all projected domestic natural gas production by 2035.71
As a consequence, the United States is expected to go from a net
importer of 11% of our natural gas needs in 2010 to a net exporter of
5% by 2035.72
Natural gas currently plays a large role in the U.S. energy
portfolio, providing 25% of our electric power generation, 30% of the
feedstock consumed in the industrial sector, and heating 56 million
homes.73 What is notable about natural gas is that it transcends the
traditional energy divide between the transportation and electricity
sectors and serves a diversity of end users. Virtually no oil is used to
generate electricity74 and virtually no electricity is used to power cars
64.

Annual Energy Review 2011, supra note 39, at 6.

65.

Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 3–9.

66.

Id. at 75.

67.

Id. at 92.

68.

Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., Shale Gas: New Opportunities, New
Challenges 5 (Jan. 2012).

69.

See Peter Behr, Natural Gas: ‘There is No Way to Tell’ How Much Gas
the U.S. Can Produce, Energywire (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.
eenews.net/energywire/2013/02/11/1 (explaining that current shale production projections are based on computer modeling that extrapolates
data on a number of variables, resulting in a large variance in possible
outcomes).

70.

Shale Gas Production, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.
gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_shalegas_s1_a.htm (last visited May 13, 2013)
(providing a useful spreadsheet tracking shale gas production by state).

71.

Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 93.

72.

Id. at 92.

73.

Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 5.

74.

See Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 48–50.
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(although that is changing).75 Natural gas, by way of contrast, is
currently used, and is expanding its use, in both sectors.76
Additionally, combined-cycle natural gas can significantly improve the
use of intermittent power producers such as solar and, therefore,
facilitate the integration of solar power into the grid.77
With such notable growth come economic and environmental
benefits. The role of natural gas in our energy portfolio has increased
to about 30%, almost exclusively in the electricity sector. Consistently, coal-fired electricity has declined from over 50% to 42% of
power production in recent years,78 while only one new coal plant has
been constructed during the same time period.79 Indeed, old coal
plants are retiring and new projects are facing closer scrutiny by state
regulators.80 Experts project that by 2016 approximately 10% of
installed capacity of coal plants will be retired.81
The even better news is job creation. An industry-sponsored study
reports that by 2035, shale gas production alone will account for up to
1.6 million jobs—having increased from 601,348 in 2010—and a total
economic value of $231 billion, up from $76 billion in 2010.82 Further,
shale gas will buoy the manufacturing sector by lowering energy costs
and raising investment in the chemical, metal, and other industries.83
The increase in manufacturing and job creation directly leads to
increased tax revenues for the local, state, and federal governments.84

75.

Id. at 30–35.

76.

Id. at 84–89.

77.

See Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 11 (referencing a
“hybrid” plant that alternates between solar-generated steam and
natural gas, resulting in a cost savings of 20 percent).

78.

Annual Energy Outlook 2012, supra note 60, at 87.

79.

See Herbert Wheary, Defying the Odds: Virginia Brings a New CoalFired Plant Online, Pub. Util. Fort., Dec. 2012, at 30 (describing the
factors that led to a new plant’s completion in the face of mounting
environmental regulations).

80.

See Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and the End of
Coal as a Source of “Cheap” Electricity, 12 U. Penn. J. Bus. L. 407,
424–32 (2010) (explaining that states have been reluctant to permit
construction of new coal plants due to the risk of dramatically increased
utility rates that might result from potential national climate legislation).

81.

Metin Celebi et al., Brattle Grp., Potential Coal Plant
Retirements: 2012 Update, at 1 (2012).

82.

IHS Global Insight, The Economic and Employment Contributions
of Shale Gas in the United States 1 (2011).

83.

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, Shale Gas: A Renaissance in
US Manufacturing? 1 (2011).

84.

IHS Global Insight, supra note 82, at 2.

1203

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 63· Issue 4·2013
Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy

From the environmental perspective, carbon emissions have been
declining and are expected to continue to do so. It has been estimated
that by replacing coal with natural gas, we can reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from electricity generation by 45%, with attendant improvements in health.85 There are several reasons for this development. Some
of the decline is attributable to a weak economy during the Great
Recession and a corresponding reduction in energy demand. Further,
the increase in wind power, the decrease in coal-fired electricity, the
increased use of natural gas, and increased fuel economy standards all
led the Department of Energy to reduce its most recent 2013 emissions
projections by roughly 30% from 2006 estimates.86
Thus, there are several good news items on the fossil fuel front,
but we cannot ignore the multiple challenges presented by shale gas
development.

V. Environmental Challenges
Historically, natural gas production has been a byproduct of oil
production. Oil producing states such as Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma,
and California have had long experience regulating both natural
resources. But today shale gas formations are occurring in a wider
array of states such as Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New
York, and West Virginia—as well as Texas and Louisiana. Several of
the newcomer states are not familiar with natural gas regulation and
some, such as New York, Maryland, and New Jersey, have adopted
moratoria on shale gas production in order to better understand the
exploration and exploitation of this natural resource.87 These states,
reasonably enough, are concerned primarily about the environmental
consequences of increased natural gas production.
The United States has been producing natural gas for over a
century. Domestic shale gas production, however, presents new
challenges. Shale gas production has increased twelvefold over the last
decade and now comprises approximately 25% of our total domestic
natural gas yield.88 Further, the success of shale gas production is
directly attributable to horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing,
which are used in approximately two-thirds of the natural gas wells in
the United States and up to 95% of all oil and gas wells currently being

85.

Pierce, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5).

86.

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., AEO2013 Early Release Overview
12–13 (2012) (comparing emissions projections from 2006 report to
those projected in 2013).

87.

Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 4.

88.

Id. at 13.
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drilled.89 Fracturing has received a significant amount of attention,
most notably for the possible environmental harms that attend that
production process.
A.

Air Pollution

Shale gas drilling operations can cause air pollution from a
number of sources. Diesel engines, rigs, trucks, and other equipment
emit greenhouse gases. Additionally, gases are released from operating
the wells themselves, especially through venting and flaring. The gas
production process and the various activities associated with it
“combine to release large amounts of methane, fine particulate matter
and VOCs. VOCs are ground level ozone precursors, and methane is a
highly [toxic] greenhouse gas.”90 Gas leakage from all of these
activities has the potential for environmental harms.91 It is significant
that, while natural gas has a lower carbon content than coal, most
estimates of carbon emissions do not take into account production
activities, which, given estimates of increased shale gas production,
simply raise the importance of the air pollution caused by hydraulic
fracturing.92
Methane, a component of natural gas, gives the greatest cause for
concern. Although the amount of methane emissions are much lower
than the emissions of carbon dioxide, methane is seventy-two times
more potent than carbon dioxide at the time of release and is twentyfive times more potent over a 100 year period.93 Consequently, as oil
89.

Nat’l Petroleum Council, Prudent Development: Realizing the
Potential of North America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil
Resources 21 (2011), available at http://www.npc.org/reports/rd.html.

90.

Beren Argetsinger, Comment, The Marcellus Shale: Bridge to a Clean
Energy Future or Bridge to Nowhere? Environmental, Energy and
Climate Policy Considerations for Shale Gas Development in New York
State, 29 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 321, 336 (2011) (citation omitted).

91.

Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U.
Colo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 67–70), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017104 (“Both new and spent drilling fluids
and muds can spill when transferred between pits or tanks and the well.
Further, oil or gas-containing substances produced from the well may
spill from the wellhead or storage tanks and pollute the site or nearby
areas.” (internal citation omitted)).

92.

Argetsinger, supra note
Benjamin K. Sovacool,
Benefits of Wind Power
(noting the lower carbon

93.

See Eric Pooley, Envtl. Def. Fund, Natural Gas—A Briefing
Paper for Candidates 5–6 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://
blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2012/08/10/natural-gas-a-briefing-paper-forcandidates (discussing the impact of natural gas leakage on climate
change).

90, at 337–38. See also Donald McCubbin &
Quantifying the Health and Environmental
to Natural Gas, 53 Energy Pol’y 429 (2013)
emissions from wind compared to shale gas).
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and gas exploration and production expand, methane leakage can
occur throughout the development of those resources from extraction
to transportation, storage, and delivery. To date, the EPA has failed
to regulate methane even as it has adopted new rules for oil and gas
producers,94 even though a Department of Energy advisory committee
recommended that “[m]easures should be taken to reduce emission of
air pollutants, ozone precursors, and methane as quickly as
practicable.”95 In short, methane needs to be monitored, regulated,
and where it can be, captured. Indeed, methane capture itself has
economic value by increasing producer profits and royalties.96
Still, the hydraulic fracturing process can involve methane
seepage either into the air or into aquifers.97 After a well is drilled, it
must be encased. Then, either during the fracturing process or after a
well has run its course, well integrity can become compromised,
resulting in leakage. There is evidence that improper drilling activity
or inadequate well encasing can increase the risk of air contamination
due to methane leakage. Unsurprisingly, regulators and industry types
testify “that fracturing has never caused contamination,” while those
opposed to fracturing “list dozens of likely contamination events.”98 In
either case, caution is advisable and monitoring and improving
drilling techniques is prudent.
Recent studies suggest that the immediate impact of shale gas
production on greenhouse gas emissions, including methane, may not
be as dire as some predictions suggest. One study concludes that
while increased efforts at emissions reductions are both warranted and
possible, “it is also clear is that the production of shale gas and
specifically, the associated hydraulic fracturing operations have not
materially altered the total [greenhouse gas] emissions from the

94.

See, e.g., David McCabe, Clean Air Task Force, EPA’s New
Standards for Oil & Gas: What They Do, and Don’t Do 1–2
(2012), available at http://www.catf.us/resources/filings/oil_and_gas
(describing the emission reduction measures in the EPA’s new standards
and remaining gaps in the rules).

95.

Sec’y of Energy Advisory Bd., Shale Gas Production
Subcommittee Second Ninety Day Report 4 (2011), available at
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov.

96.

See Susan Harvey et al., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Leaking
Profits: The U.S. Oil and Gas Industry Can Reduce Pollution,
Conserve Resources, and Make Money by Preventing Methane
Waste 3 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.nrdc.org/documents.asp
?topicid=12 (noting the economic and environmental benefits of curbing
methane leakage).

97.

See Wiseman, supra note 91 (manuscript at 49–56) (discussing the risks
of methane leakage and the state regulatory response).

98.

Id. (manuscript at 52).
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natural gas sector.”99 And another study concludes that under
appropriate scenarios, methane leakages are “modest.”100
Like any discussion of a complex policy matter, the devil is in the
details. There are studies indicating that methane leakage from natural
gas production can have negative greenhouse gas effects.101 These
studies indicate that a transition from coal to natural gas actually could
reduce or negate the climate benefits of lower carbon dioxide emissions.
The trick in the studies resides, of course, in the assumptions. In the
short term, as natural gas replaces coal in the electricity sector, CO2
reductions will take place. When analyzing the long-term effects of
increased natural gas production, the issue becomes twofold. First,
what is the target number regarding CO2 in the atmosphere? Is it 450
ppm or 550 ppm, by way of example? Second, how long should we
envision natural gas serving as a “bridge fuel?” The point simply is that
methane leakage presents an environmental risk, and that risk increases
the longer the duration for the use of natural gas in our energy
portfolio. Precisely because natural gas does emit greenhouse gases
including the toxic methane, and even though it can replace coal-fired
power production, we cannot rely on this long term if the goal is to
transition to a clean energy future.
B.

Water Pollution

Water is a significant input into the hydraulic fracturing process.
Consequently, several water issues emerge. First, drilling requires
large volumes of water to be withdrawn from both ground and surface
waters.102 Second, during drilling, various chemicals are mixed into the
99.

Francis O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, Shale Gas Production: Potential
Versus Actual Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 7 Envtl. Res. Letters No.
044030, at 1, 5 (2012), available at http://globalchange.mit.edu/research/
publications/2368.

100. Michael Levi, Climate Consequences of Natural Gas as a Bridge Fuel,
Climatic Change (Jan. 3, 2013), http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/
10.1007%2Fs10584-012-0658-3.
101. See, e.g., Tom M.L. Wigley, Coal to Gas: The Influence of Methane
Leakage, 108 Climatic Change 601, 607 (2011) (finding that replacing
coal with natural gas “results in increased rather than decreased global
warming” due to methane leakage); Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro
& Anthony Ingraffea, Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of
Natural Gas from Shale Formations: A Letter, 106 Climatic Change
679, 688 (2011) (“[S]ubstituting shale gas for these other fossil fuels may
not have the desired effect of mitigating climate warming.”).
102. Rebecca Hammer & Jeanne VanBriesen, Nat. Res. Def.
Council, In Fracking’s Wake: New Rules are Needed to
Protect Our Health and Environment from Contaminated
Wastewater 11 (2012) (contaminated “flowback” and “produced
water” may “reach into the millions of gallons” over the lifetime of a
shale gas well).
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water, and consequent surface spills can affect drinking water
resources.103 Third, well injection also has an impact on drinking
water resources.104 Fourth, wastewater must be transported and stored
and spillage from either process can also have health effects.105 And,
finally, wastewater needs to be treated and disposed, and this can
impact drinking water resources.106 The Environmental Protection
Agency was directed by Congress to study and review the effect of
hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources.107 In December 2012,
the EPA issued a progress report on its study.108
The EPA study is a result of eighteen research projects as well as
data collected directly from both the oil and natural gas industries as
well as from states with high levels of oil and gas activity.109
Additionally, the EPA analyzed data from FracFocus, which is a
national hydraulic fracturing chemical registry operated by the
Groundwater Protection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas
Compact Commission110 and is funded by two fossil fuel lobbying
groups: the American Petroleum Institute and America’s Natural Gas
Alliance.111 The EPA is also conducting laboratory research and is
engaging in consultation with other federal state and interstate
agencies, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and other
stakeholders. It is the goal of the EPA to inform the public and
provide decision makers at all levels of high-quality scientific
information to be used in the decision-making process. In short, the
EPA progress report details the steps the agency is taking to satisfy
its charge from Congress. Although the administration has not issued
103. Id. at 1 (discussing the attendant dangers of “flowback” and “produced
water” as wastewater by-products of hydrofracking).
104. Id. at 6 (discussing the risk of contaminating groundwater when wastes
are injected into Class II disposal wells).
105. Id. (discussing the risk of “accidental release” anywhere wastewater is
handled).
106. Id. (discussing the risks of discharging inadequately treated waste water
and the creation of residuals following treatment).
107. H.R. Rep. No. 111-316, at 109 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).
108. EPA, Study of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing
on Drinking Water Resources: Progress Report (2012).
109. Id. at 1–2.
110. Id. at 54–61; FracFocus: Chemical Disclosure
http://fracfocus.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).

Registry,

111. See Mike Soraghan & Ellen M. Gilmer, Hydraulic Fracturing: Revised
Interior Rule Loops in Industry-Favored FracFocus, Energywire (Feb.
8, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2013/02/08/1 (discussing a new rule promulgated by the Department of the Interior
allowing companies to report chemicals used in fracturing through
FracFocus’s database).
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its final report and continues its work, its plan of action is instructive.
The EPA will examine the several uses of water used in the hydraulic
fracturing process as well as undertake a detailed analysis of the
chemicals used and their effects on drinking water.112
Initial discussions on drinking water suggest that hydraulic
fracturing will have minimal impact on freshwater aquifers “because
fracturing typically takes place at a depth of 6,000 to 10,000 feet,
while drinking water tables are typically less than 1,000 feet deep.”113
The average well requires from three to five million gallons of water
for drilling and hydraulic fracturing. While these withdrawals are
significant, they involve significantly less water than that used for
nuclear or coal power generation. To the extent that shale formations
are developed in the eastern United States, this amount of water
withdrawal is manageable. Further, producers can use water recycling
to reduce the total amount of consumption as well as potential
environmental impact.114
Nevertheless, more recent developments on the use of water, its
pollution, and possible human health effects are disturbing. The New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation, for example,
estimates that each well “requires anywhere from 2.9 million to 7.8
million gallons of injected water,” not to mention all the additional
chemicals in that water.115 That agency also reports that over the next
thirty years there could be up to 40,000 wells developed through
hydraulic fracturing technologies thus indicating a significant increase
in water withdrawal.116
More problematically, water that is injected into a well will flow
back. Anywhere from 10 to 50% of the injected water can be returned
to the surface, and that flowback water contains chemicals used

112. EPA, supra note 108, at 163–71 (providing a summary of research
progress and next steps).
113. Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 13; see also Scott Kell,
Ground Water Prot. Council, State Oil and Gas Agency
Groundwater Investigations and their Role in Advancing
Regulatory Reforms: A Two-State Review: Ohio and Texas
102 (2011) (noting that neither Ohio nor Texas has a single documented
incident of groundwater contamination from hydraulic fracturing).
114. See Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., supra note 68, at 14 (discussing the
potential effects of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources).
115. See Argetsinger, supra note 90, at 331 (citing N.Y. State Dep’t of
Envtl. Conservation, Revised Draft: Supplemental Generic
Environmental Impact Statement on the Oil, Gas and
Solution Mining Regulatory Program 8 (2011)).
116. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 115,
§ 6.1.1.7, at 6-6.
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during the fracturing operation.117 Wastewater chemicals are often
toxic, including organic pollutants, heavy metals, and radioactive
materials, some of which are naturally occurring.118 Industry has been
reluctant to fully disclose the chemical composition of wastewater,
thus hiding risks to environmental health.119
Consequently, these chemically tainted waters must be managed
and treated properly. One regulatory option is to require disclosure of
the exact composition of the chemical fluids used in the process.120
Many producers have self-reported and use the public website
FracFocus to disclose volumes as well as the chemical makeup of the
fluids. In most shale regions, the flowback and produced water can be
disposed of by injection into deep geologic formations. But in some
regions, most notably in the Marcellus Shale, those formations are
limited. Consequently, in such regions, flowback must be treated,
recycled, disposed of, or delivered to water treatment facilities.121
Unfortunately, the EPA, pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of
2005,122 is prohibited from regulating hydraulic fracturing operations
under the Safe Drinking Water Act.123 This gaping loophole is known as
the “Halliburton exception” named for the oil and gas industry firm
that lobbied for it and patented hydraulic fracturing in the 1940s.124

117. See O’Sullivan & Paltsev, supra note 99, at 2 (detailing the flowback
process).
118. See Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, Drilling for Natural Gas in
the Marcellus and Utica Shales: Environmental Regulatory
Basics 3 (2012) (describing the environmental concerns related to
drilling).
119. See Argetsinger, supra note 90, at 332–36 (discussing the difficulty in
gauging the risks posed by chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing due to
industry nondisclosure and lax federal environmental regulations).
120. See Wiseman, supra note 91 (manuscript at 34–35) (discussing the pros
and cons of disclosure).
121. See O’Sullivan & Paltsev, supra note 99, at 2 (analyzing potential gas
emissions produced during well flowback).
122. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 117 Stat. 594 (2005).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) (2006).
124. See Jeffrey D. Dintzer & Elizabeth M. Burnside, Law360, Take
It Easy on Fracking (2011), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/Documents/DintzerBurnside-TakeItEasyOnFracking.pdf
(noting that while an initial EPA report found no threat to groundwater
from hydraulic fracturing, the EPA is currently conducting a revised
study); Amy Tiemann, Why You Need to Know About Fracking—It
May be Coming to a Field or Neighborhood Near You (Oct. 8, 2011),
http://amytiemann.com/tag/halliburton-exception
(discussing
the
insufficient federal and state regulation of hydraulic fracturing); The
Halliburton Loophole, Earthworks, http://www.earthworksaction.org/
issues/detail/inadequate_regulation_of_hydraulic_fracturing (last visited
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Fortunately, the EPA has initiated a rulemaking to set water discharge
standards for wastewater from shale gas production.125 Additionally,
industry environmental groups and state regulators have devised a
program to develop, under the acronym STRONGER, “guidelines for
better management and disposal of oil and gas wastes.”126
Thus, water use involves several environmental issues including
the amount used during injection and the possible environmental and
human health effects that can result from the effects of the use of
chemicals in the process. Noted risks include the introduction of
invasive species between water resources, increased surface water
temperatures, increased pollutant concentrations, harmful water
plants and wildlife, and reduced water quality for all users. These
effects will vary depending upon levels of toxicity, how the chemicals
are introduced into the environment, and the routes by which
humans, wildlife, and plant life are exposed to them, including
chemical spills.127
C.

Community Disruption

As noted above, shale gas development is occurring in regions,
particularly in the eastern United States, that are unfamiliar with oil
and gas exploration and production. Developing sites require the use
of trucks and other heavy equipment, as well as the possible
construction of new roads, drill pads, and gathering lines. These
activities affect the immediate area and effect air emissions, odors,
noise, spill risk, land use, wildlife, and the general life styles of these
communities.
The shale gas boom has seen a significant increase in drilling
activity. More wells are being drilled, and with that increase there is a
greater need for more surface usage. Operators need more access
roads; habitats are disturbed; transportation activity increases
dramatically; soil erosion occurs; and storm water quality is adversely
Feb. 23, 2013) (detailing efforts by Congress and local governments to
close the Halliburton Loophole).
125. See EPA, EPA Initiates Rulemaking to Set Discharge
Standards for Wastewater from Shale Gas Extraction (2011)
(discussing EPA efforts to research and reevaluate the treatment of
shale gas wastewater).
126. Wiseman, supra note 91 (manuscript at 41). STRONGER is the State
Review of Oil & Natural Gas Environmental Regulations initiated by
the EPA. Id. (manuscript at 40); see also Regulatory Determination for
Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, Development and Production
Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,445, 25,456–57 (July 6, 1988) (noting the
development of a review system for the adequacy of state regulations).
127. See Wiseman, supra note 91 (manuscript at 29–31) (describing the
composition and dangers of fracturing chemicals and the impact of
chemical spills).
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affected.128 In addition to growing conflicts between local, state, and
federal authorities regarding the extent of hydraulic fracturing and its
regulation, conflicts about the use of and disruption to public lands
are also increasing.129

VI. Recommendations
Given the potential environmental consequences of hydraulic
fracturing, there is no shortage of recommendations regarding this
drilling process. At the federal level, the EPA continues to research
the consequences of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water.
Additionally, the Bureau of Land Management has proposed a rule to
regulate fracturing on public and Indian lands. This rule would
require disclosure of chemicals used throughout the drilling process,
attempt to improve the well-bore integrity, and address issues on
flow-back waters.130
Additionally, federal regulators should reconsider both the
Halliburton exemption and the exemption of fracking under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Further, Congress has had
legislation introduced, known as the “Fracturing Responsibility and
Awareness of Chemicals Act,” that promotes public disclosure.131
Indeed, national regulations have the advantage of making fracking
regulation even across state boundaries, and that uniformity should
benefit the industry as it will not have to comply with multiple state
regulatory schemes.132
Professor Hannah Wiseman has written an important analysis of
shale gas production and the environmental concerns generated by its
rapid growth.133 Equally important are the recommendations that she
makes. Her paper is premised on the idea that the most pressing risks
128. See id. (manuscript at 62–70) (discussing the challenges presented by
the construction of well pads and access roads and potential solutions).
129. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Colorado Communities Take on Fight Against
Energy Land Leases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2013, at 15 (noting the
opposition of local residents in Colorado to opening up federal land for
oil and natural gas drilling).
130. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on
Federal and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (proposed May 11, 2012)
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
131. See David Spence, Energy Mgmt. and Info. Ctr., Fracking
Regulations: Is Federal Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation
Around the Corner? (2010) (describing the federal government’s
recent attempts to regulate hydraulic fracturing).
132. Cf. Jody Freeman, The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling, N.Y.
Times, July 6, 2012, at A23 (arguing for federal baseline standards for
the regulation of hydraulic fracturing).
133. Wiseman, supra note 91.
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may not arise from the injection of chemicals and water into wells,
but from other stages of the natural gas development process,
including a higher rate of well drilling.134 Additionally, given the
magnitude of gas production operations, risks are introduced
throughout the process. Spills, transportation, storage, and disposal of
wastewater must also be given attention.135
From her analysis of identified risks and regulatory innovations
that have been occurring in several states, she provides a list of ten
regulations that states should consider including:
•detailed spill prevention and response plans for all oil and gas
sites;
•ensure that surface water withdrawals do not reduce instream flow below levels needed to support aquatic life;
•use closed-loop tanks for storage drilling in fracturing wastes;
•increased setbacks between well pads and natural resources;
•require that wastewater treatment plants provide evidence
that they can treat flowback water;
•adopt requirements for preventing well leakage;
•encourage or require the reuse of flow-back water;
•prohibit the use of used well casings;
•require well operators to pressure test the wells before
fracturing up to maximum pressure and use blowout
prevention equipment;
•adopt a rebuttable presumption that methane contamination
within a certain distance from drilling operations can occur
within a certain time drilling; and
•require air emissions monitoring and reporting.136
Professor Wiseman notes that these recommendations are directed to
state regulators.137 Therefore, there are a range of possible regulatory
activities and the appropriate level of governance must also be
addressed.138
134. Id. (manuscript at 8–10).
135. Id. (manuscript at 23–47).
136. Id. (manuscript at 77–78).
137. Id. (manuscript at 77).
138. Regarding the appropriate level of governance, that is, whether the
federal government or the states should have primary jurisdiction,
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Conclusion
From the above analysis, I conclude that natural gas, particularly
shale gas, should not be included in the definition of clean energy. For
all its environmental improvements and economic benefits, shale gas
continues our traditional fossil fuel energy model. For most of the
twentieth century that model yielded great benefits, including a
robust economy and the construction of a national infrastructure, and
it served as the backbone of U.S. world leadership, particularly during
the two world wars.
But that model benefited from a series of government supports,
including tax breaks and other subsidies; under enforcement of
royalty, environmental, and safety obligations; and an energy
bureaucracy that has played an intentionally supportive role that has
buoyed domestic oil and gas producers to phenomenal levels of
wealth.139 In short, the playing field between fossil fuels and clean
energy is not level regardless of the increasing, but too often episodic,
financial supports afforded new and cleaner technologies.140
compare David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the
Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431
(2013) (arguing for narrow federal regulation), with Michael Burger,
Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA L. Rev. Online 150
(2013), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02-2013/Burger.pdf (contending that greater federal regulation is necessary).
139. In the first quarter of 2012, for example, ExxonMobil posted profits of
$9.45 billion or $104 million per day. See Rebecca Leber, Exxon Makes
$104 Million in Profit per Day So Far in 2012, While Americans Are
Stuck with a Higher Gas Bill, ThinkProgress (Apr. 26, 2012, 10:08
AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/04/26/471469/exxon-takes104-million-profits-per-day-so-far-in-2012-while-americans-are-stuckwith-a-higher-gas-bill/ (breaking down Exxon’s profits and discussing
the company’s political influence). The company’s second quarter profits
almost doubled to nearly $16 billion. See Steve Hargreaves, Exxon
Reports Record Profit of Nearly $16 Billion, CNNMoney (July 26,
2012, 10:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/26/news/companies/
exxon-profit/index.htm (noting that given the decline in oil and gas
prices, Exxon’s record profits were largely due to the divestment of
foreign operations).
140. See Cong. Budget Off., Federal Financial Support for the
Development and Production of Fuels and Energy
Technologies (Mar. 2012) (detailing the tax preferences and direct
government investments for fuel and energy technologies). According to
the CBO study, in 2011 energy efficiency and renewable resources
received 78% of the energy-related tax preferences. Id. at 5. But the tax
code contains only four permanent tax breaks, and three go to fossil
fuels and one goes to nuclear power. In addition, historically, from 1916
into the 1970s, all such expenditures went to fossil fuel industries and
fossil fuel industries received more than two-thirds of government
largesse through 2007. Id. at 2.
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Today, the natural gas industry is highly competitive as prices
continue to fall, sometimes to the dismay of gas exploration
companies and those that finance them.141 But the fact that some
explorers cannot turn a profit is indicative of competition rather than
a market failure. Neither oil nor gas producers need the helping hand
of government. Additionally, as natural gas displaces coal for
electricity generation, we will witness a lowering of carbon dioxide
emissions, particularly as natural gas continues to serve that sector.
In short, we are substituting a cleaner burning fuel in the electric
sector but we are not using a clean fuel. If the clean energy transition
is to be successful, then the United States, and indeed the world,
must move away from fossil fuels. In the United States, we can
improve national security, reduce economic threats, and reduce
environmental degradation through clean energy. We must continue a
commitment to a clean transition by expanding the use of renewal
resources and energy efficiencies. Shale gas plays no role in that
picture.
By concentrating on natural gas development we run the risk of
diminishing the importance of our concentration on clean energy
activities.142 As a realist, I recognize that natural gas will play a large
role in our energy economy. Further, I do not dismiss its positive
environmental and economic benefits. Nevertheless, even though
natural gas has been a major component of our hydrocarbon economy
and even though it will continue to play significant role, as a matter
of a sound future energy policy, we cannot allow it to distract us from
a more important and economically promising clean energy future.

141. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss & Eric Lipton, After the Boom in Natural
Gas, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2012, at BU1 (noting that a market surplus
and low prices have led to financial hardship for natural gas companies).
142. See John Broder, After Federal Jolt, Clean Energy Seeks New Spark,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2012, at F2 (noting the lack of funding for
alternative energy investments as federal stimulus money runs out).
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